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Abstract
This note analyses a simple imperfectly competitive general equilibrium model where the entry
mechanism generates an endogenous markup. In this second-best world fiscal policy is more
effective than in Walrasian or in fixed-markup monopolistic competition models, as it produces
efficiency gains through entry.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The role of imperfect competition in the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy
has been analysed by several authors following the seminal paper by Hart (1982).
Dixon (1987) and Mankiw (1988) demonstrated the multiplier is strictly increasing in
the monopoly degree, as pure profits are generated, stimulating households’ income
and consequently aggregate demand. Startz (1989) introduced entry in a 'long-run'
model, eliminating pure profits and, as a consequence, switching the profit-multiplier
mechanism off. Dixon and Lawler (1996) showed Startz’s conclusions strongly
depended on the class of functionals chosen, namely constant marginal shares in the
utility function. Recent developments extended the basic Dixon, Mankiw and Startz
(DMS) framework: e.g., Heijdra and van der Ploeg (1996), Molana and Montagna
(2000), Reinhorn (1998), and Torregrosa (1998).
However, all these models share a common Bertrandian flavour: they use Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition as the basic market structure1. Given the
CES sub-utility function assumed, each firm faces a constant-elasticity demand
function, hence the markup is also constant. This assumption is not consistent with the
evidence presented in Galí (1995b), Martins and Scarpetta (1999), and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1995b) that support the hypothesis of counter-cyclical markups.
                                                
* Tel.: +351-213 925 976; fax: +351-213 922 808; e-mail: lukosta@iseg.utl.pt
1 Dixon (1987) and Hart (1982) are exceptions where the flavour is mainly Cournotian, but entry is not
considered.
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 Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1995) and Galí (1994a, 1994b, 1995), inter alia,
produced dynamic general equilibrium models with endogenous markups. However,
they were not especially concerned with fiscal policy effectiveness. Wu and Zhang
(2000) assumed monopolistic producers are large at the economy level therefore
considering the feedback effects of their own prices on aggregate price and quantity
indices. However, the endogenous markup disappears for a large number of goods in
the economy.
In this paper I use a Cournotian Monopolistic Competition framework, following
d'Aspremont et al. (1997), generating an endogenous markup when entry means more
firms per industry. Here, fiscal policy produces an aggregate demand externality as it
stimulates entry, pushing the markup downwards, and introducing efficiency gains in
the economy.
2. THE MODEL
I use the basic structure of the DMS framework, and Mankiw’s notation wherever
possible. This is a closed economy populated by a large number of identical
households, consuming n (a large number of) imperfect substitutes and supplying
labour, which is the only input.
2.1. The representative household
Households maximise a Cobb-Douglas utility function given by U=Cα.(1-L)1-α,
where C is a CES consumption basket, L represents labour supply for a unit time
endowment, and 0<α<1. For sake of simplicity, I assume there is no love for variety in
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where cj stands for households’ consumption of variety j=1,...,n, and σ>1 is the
elasticity of substitution2. The aggregate consumption good C is chosen to be the
numéraire, so P, the appropriate cost-of-living index, is normalised to unity3. The
budget constraint is given by





∑ = + −
1
Π  , (2)
where w represents the wage rate, Π stands for profit income, and T is a lump-sum
tax. The optimisation problem is solved in the usual two-stage procedure: (i) the
demand for aggregate consumption and the labour supply are derived, maximising
utility given the duality condition Σ j
n
j jp c P C= =1 . . :
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2.2. The government
I assume government has the same preferences for varieties as the households, its
expenditure, G, is pure waste, and it is financed by the above-mentioned lump-sum
tax levied on households.
2.3. Firms
The production sector is composed by n identical industries, each one producing a
differentiated good. The number of industries is assumed to be large enough to rule
out feedback effects from the macroeconomic level. Thus, macroeconomic variables
are taken as given by firms. Each industry is composed by m≥1 identical producers. I
assume firms compete over quantities with other firms in the same industry (intra-
industrial Cournot competition), and they compete over prices with firms in other
industries (inter-industrial Bertrand competition). This set of conjectures corresponds
                                                
2 A weaker condition than σ>1 would be sufficient to ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium in
this model.
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, where pj stands for the price of good j.
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to Cournotian Monopolistic Competition (CMC) and it nests Monopolistic
Competition (MC) as a special case where m=1. Firms are labelled such that industry
j=1,...,n is composed by producers from (j-1).m+1 to j.m.
Production technologies are identical in all industries and they are given by
yi+Φ=1.Li, where yi≥0 represents the output of firm i, Φ ≥0 is a fixed cost, and Li its
labour input. The representative firm maximises its profits given by πi=pj.yi-w.Li,
subject to the (i) production function; (ii) the ‘objective’ market demand function
given by Yj=(pj)
-σ.Y/n, where Yj represents demand for variety j, and Y=C+G stands for
aggregate demand; and (iii) the market-clearing condition given by Y yj ii j m
j m=




an intra-industry symmetric equilibrium the condition equalising marginal revenue to







 =σ  , (6)
and given an inter-industry symmetric equilibrium prices are equal for all varieties,
i.e., pj=P=1, ∀j=1,...,n.
2.4. Macroeconomic equilibrium
The macroeconomic model is closed when: (i) aggregate output equals aggregate
demand, i.e., .
1 ( 1). 1
. .
n j m
j ij i j m
p y P Y
= = − +
=∑ ∑ ;4 (ii) total profit income is given by
Π = =Σ i
j m
i1





Let us assume now that firms are free to enter or leave the market in order to
eliminate pure profits. Since profits depend on the level of aggregate demand (or
output), there is a single value for Y that generates πi=0, given m and n
Y m n m= −σ . . . .10 5 Φ  . (7)
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4 In a model with differentiated products, (nominal) aggregate output is given by (nominal) value added
created in all industries.
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Combining (7) and (8) we obtain a reduced form for the zero-profit condition,
given by h(n,m,G)=0, where, using the implicit-function theorem, it is easy to see that
∂h/∂n<0, ∂h/∂m<0,5 and ∂h/∂G>0. Thus, there are not enough equations to determine
all the endogenous variables in the model. This indeterminacy is depicted in Figure 1.
If we depart from point A, for G1>G0, entry can lead to a situation with more
industries (point B), more firms per industry (point C), or a combination of both
(somewhere on BC), all on the same isoprofit schedule6.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
For sake of simplicity I analyse both extreme situations in alternative: in case I
entry leads to more industries (n is endogenous) and the number of firms is always the
same as in MC models; in case II entry leads to more firms per industry (m is
endogenous) and the number of industries is fixed7.
3. THE MULTIPLIER
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where asterisks denote equilibrium values for the variables. Given equation (6),
dw*/dm*=1/[σ.(m*)2]>0, i.e., an exogenous increase in m reduces the markup,
expanding labour demand, and the real wage increases as a consequence. Furthermore,
this effect decreases when more competition is introduced either at the intra-industry
level (a larger value for m) or at the inter-industry level (a larger value for σ). In the
Walrasian case (i.e., when σ→∞ and/or m*→∞)8, dw*/dm*=0.
In case I (n is endogenous), dm*/dG=0, i.e., the markup is fixed and so is the wage
rate. Thus, fiscal policy stimulates output, but there is no difference between the CMC
and the Walrasian multipliers, both given by 1-α. This is the main result in Startz
(1989): once the profit mechanism is switched off, government expenditure partially
crowds out private consumption in the same way, despite the markup level.
                                                
5 Assuming n*>α/[(m*)2.Φ.σ.(2.σ.m*-1)]. This condition is verified even for small values of n*.
Imposing G=0 in the initial steady state, the condition is transformed into n*>α.σ/Φ, and Φ<1 in order
to obtain m n n* . . . / . .= ≥α σ σΦ Φ0 5 1.
6 I will treat n and m as continuous variables, despite the fact they are integers in reality. Of course this
is only a simplifying assumption and one can interpret these numbers as averages.
7 The implications of full endogeneity are analysed in a companion paper, Costa and Dixon (2001).
8 Of course Φ=0 in the Walrasian case, to rule out increasing returns.
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Here, when government expenditure stimulates aggregate demand, profits increase
and more firms enter existing industries. Consequently, intra-industry competition
increases, the markup decreases, and extra wage income induces another round of the
multiplier. Entry generates an aggregate demand externality, as it induces efficiency
gains in the economy. It is easy to notice that α.dw*/dG, the efficiency gain, is
decreasing in both σ and m. Thus, it is a decreasing function of the monopoly degree
in the economy9. In this case, free entry does not eliminate the difference between the
CMC and the Walrasian multiplier, and this difference is strictly increasing in the
level of market power, as it happens in “short-run” models.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The endogenous markup hypothesis has been ignored in traditional static general
equilibrium models with imperfectly competitive goods markets. Considering the
possibility of entry in existing industries produces efficiency gains enhancing the
effectiveness of fiscal policy.
Even when entry eliminates profits, fiscal policy is shown to be more effective
under Cournotian Monopolistic Competition than in the Walrasian case, when the
number of firms per industry responds to the aggregate demand stimulus. More intra-
industry competition leads to a smaller markup, larger real wages, and it launches
another round of the multiplier.
This possibility is consistent with the evidence on counter-cyclical markups and
points towards the necessity of studying the crossed effects between fiscal and
industrial policies.
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9 The Lerner index is given by 1/(σ.m*).
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FIG. 1: THE ZERO-PROFIT CONDITION AND ENTRY
